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THE ‘SHADOW OF SUCCESSION’ IN FAMILY FIRMS 
Sandra Diwisch∗+, Peter Voithofer∗∗ and Christoph R. Weiss∗ 
 
Abstract: 
The paper analyses the relationship between succession and firm performance. Using a unique 
panel data set on a sample of roughly 4,000 Austrian family firms we examine empirically the 
impact of past succession as well as future succession plans on employment growth and 
investment behaviour. Analysing succession plans, we do not find a ‘shadow of succession’ 
effect. No significant difference in employment growth and investment behaviour is found 
between firms that plan to transfer the firm in the next ten years and those who do not. In 
contrast, past succession exerts a significant and positive employment growth effect which 
becomes stronger over time. The impact of past succession on investments is also positive but 
not significantly different from zero. Thus, our findings provide support for the existence of a 
positive employment shadow after a transfer, whereas the shadow of succession hypothesis has 
to be rejected prior to transition.  
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I. Introduction 
Most firms in the world are family firms.1 In recent years, family firms have received 
growing attention in different fields of economics: literature on entrepreneurship focuses on the 
decision to enter into family businesses, labour market economists investigate the entrepreneurs’ 
decisions to retire and, from the perspective of the corporate governance literature, family firms 
allow economists to study the patterns of separation of ownership and control. The focus of our 
investigation is on one particular aspect of family firms: the issue of family succession. The 
circumstances of family succession are of great importance not only for the family members 
directly involved but also (per definition) for the long-run survival and success of family firms. 
In an extensive review of the existing research Handler (1994) finds: ‘researchers in the field of 
family business agree that succession is the most important issue that most family firms face’ (p. 
133).2  
Previous research in this area suggests two possible explanations for the prevalence of 
succession within the family. The first stresses the importance of capital market imperfections. 
Pesquin et al. (1999) point out that intra-family succession enables the family to realise benefits 
from intergenerational risk-sharing when annuity markets are incomplete. It provides an often 
implicit contractual insurance arrangement since the generations overlap and share income. The 
authors mention additional advantages of intra-family succession such as ‘smooth’ transition, 
reduction in transfer cost, and lower transfer taxes. To the extent that capital market 
imperfections are important, successful entrepreneurs may be better able to transfer financial 
wealth to their offspring, thereby relaxing capital market restraints. 
The second explanation argues that parents transmit to their offsprings valuable work 
experience, reputation and other managerial human capital. In the context of agricultural 
production in low-income countries, Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1985) argue that the existence of 
returns to firm-specific experience creates incentives for children to work in the family firm 
when young. In addition, maintaining family control often is of symbolic importance and thus, 
the transfer of the firm to the next generation is regarded an important objective of entrepreneurs 
(Gasson and Errington 1993; Blanc 1993). 
                                                 
1 Gersick et al. (1997) report that family firms account for 65-80% of all worldwide business, and for about 40% of 
the Fortune 500 companies. Although many family firms are small, in aggregate they represent about half of the 
U.S. gross domestic product (Aronoff et al. 1997) and employ more than 80% of the work force (Neuberg and Lank, 
1998).  
2 Succession is so central that Ward (1987) chooses to define family firms in terms of the potential for succession: 
‘we define a family business as one that will be passed on for the family’s next generation to manage and control’ 
(p. 252). 
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Empirical studies indicate that the importance of family firms and family succession 
differs between economies as well as between different sectors within an economy. By studying 
occupations of different family members (grandfathers, fathers and sons), Laband and Lentz 
(1983) find that occupational inheritance is particularly strong among farmers and to a lesser 
extent among other groups such as lawyers and self-employed proprietors. A large share of the 
existing empirical literature focuses on succession in the farm sector,3 little empirical work has 
been devoted to succession in the non-farm sector.  
The purpose of this paper is to analyse succession in small and medium sized Austrian 
manufacturing companies of which about 90% are family businesses. More specifically, we 
focus on the relationship between succession and firm performance. First, we investigate 
empirically whether there is a significant difference in firm behaviour and performance 
(employment and investment) between two groups of firms: firms where succession has taken 
place during the last few years and otherwise identical firms that did not experience succession. 
Secondly, we investigate whether future succession plans cast their shadows on firm 
performance even before the transfer actually takes place. This ‘shadow of succession’ effect 
was suggested by Kimhi et al. (1995) who argue that the occurrence of succession within the 
family in the near future might motivate entrepreneurs to invest and raise current firm size. This 
link between succession considerations and firm performance might become stronger the closer 
the event of succession comes. The present study thus aims at answering the following questions:  
− Is there a significant difference in employment growth and investment behaviour between 
family businesses that plan succession in the near future (or that have been transferred 
recently) and family businesses without any such succession event? 
− If so, how long is the ‘shadow of succession’, i.e., how many years before and after the 
transfer of the firm can we observe a significant difference?  
The paper is organised as follows. The next section presents related literature on the link 
between succession and corporate performance in family firms. The data are described in section 
III, section IV presents the methodology and the empirical results and section V discusses the 
implications of the findings. 
 
                                                 
3 Empirical studies on succession in the farm sector typically examine the probability and the timing of family 
takeover (Stiglbauer and Weiss 2000; Glauben et. al. 2002; Kimhi 1994; Kimhi and Lopez 1997, 1999). 
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II. Literature Review 
Previous research on succession plans has not demonstrated a clear link between 
succession considerations and firm performance. Kimhi et al. (1995) did not find empirical 
evidence for the ‘shadow of succession’ effect where firms start expanding in expectation of 
future succession. Using panel data on farm households in Israel the authors find that the 
occurrence of succession in a future time period does not have any significant effect on farm 
size. Stiglbauer and Weiss (2000) find that the relationship between previous firm growth and 
the probability of firm succession is negative. They explain this by referring to the possible 
aversion of firm operators to make important long-term decisions immediately before 
transferring the firm to a successor. Potter and Lobley (1992) show that the investment behaviour 
of entrepreneurs without successors is radically different from those with a successor already 
identified, indicating a relationship between succession planning and investment decisions. The 
Austrian Institute for Small Business Research4 (2002) investigates the performance of Austrian 
small and medium sized manufacturing companies and observes that firms reporting succession 
plans for the next ten years generally invest less and show stagnating sales compared to average 
small and medium sized companies and recently transferred enterprises.  
The impact of intergenerational successions on firm performance after the succession 
event has taken place has been widely investigated, albeit empirical evidence has yielded quite 
inconsistent results. Analysing the farm sector, Perrier-Cornet et al. (1991) find that in France, 
the Netherlands and Belgium farm modernisation is associated with inter-generational 
succession whereas they do not find such a relationship for farms located in the United 
Kingdom, Italy and Greece. Using panel data of Austrian full-time farms, Weiss (1999) reports a 
strongly significant effect of succession on subsequent farm growth and survival. Kimhi et al. 
(1995) find that during the 1970s, intergenerational succession contributed tremendously to farm 
expansion, both in terms of size and in terms of intensity of production. However, expansion was 
not observed in farms experiencing intergenerational succession in the 1980s. The authors argue 
that this may be due to the widespread farm financial crisis in the 1980s, forcing many 
successors to seek off-farm employment.  
Empirical work on the post-succession performance in the non-farm sector typically 
compares the corporate performance of firms that were handed down to a family member to 
firms that were transferred to a family outsider. Analysing actual successions within Canadian 
                                                 
4 now: Institute for SME Research. 
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family firms, Smith and Amoako-Adu (1999) report a significant decrease in the operating 
performance of firms appointing family successors. For the sample of firms appointing non-
family successors the operating performance is found to significantly improve after the transfer. 
They explain their findings by the general underperformance of non-family successor firms in 
the pre-succession period. Similar results are reported by Perez-Gonzalez (2002) for a sample of 
U.S. publicly traded firms. Firms that appoint a family CEO are observed to exhibit large 
declines in return on assets and market-to-book ratios within three years of transition relative to 
firms that appoint unrelated CEOs. In contrast to Smith and Amoako-Adu (1999), the author 
finds that family and non-family successor firms exhibit a very similar performance level ex 
ante.  
Related to these studies is a series of empirical papers that investigate the performance of 
family firms based on different CEO status, i.e. founder controlled, descendant controlled and 
family outsider controlled. This provides some indirect evidence on the performance of firms 
that were handed down to a family member. Using cross sectional data on U.S. firms, Anderson 
and Reeb (2003) find a positive performance effect when family members serve as CEOs 
relative to unrelated CEOs. However, descendant CEOs are observed to perform worse than 
founder CEOs, indicating that succession lowers corporate performance. Similar results are 
reported by Morck et al. (1998). Using a sample of Canadian firms, they find that firms 
controlled by heirs of the founder show lower profitability than founder and family outsider 
controlled firms in the same industry. Evidence provided by Villalonga and Amit (2005) 
supports this negative relationship, albeit the negative effect of descendant-CEOs on firm value 
is observed to be entirely attributable to second generation family firms. The marginal 
contribution to firm value of third-generation descendant-CEOs is not significant whereas that of 
fourth-generation descendant-CEOs is significantly positive. In contrast, evidence provided by 
McConaughy et al. (1998) does not support a negative relationship between family successions 
and corporate performance. Using data on U.S. founding family controlled firms, they document 
that descendant-controlled firms are more efficient than founder-controlled firms. They generate 
significantly higher sales growth rates, sales per employee and cash flow per employee than the 
founder-controlled firms, indicating that successors were able to enhance firm performance. In 
explaining their results the authors argue that ‘descendants are in a position to consolidate the 
advantages passed on to them by the founders’ (p. 15). Evidence on the corporate performance of 
family firms in Europe is provided by Sraer and Thesmar (2004). Analysing a sample of 750 
corporations listed on the French stock market, they do not find a significant difference in firm 
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performance of founder controlled firms and descendant controlled firms. Both, founder CEOs 
and descendant CEOs are associated with better corporate performance than unrelated CEOs. 
Referring to the above mentioned literature, Adams et al. (2003) point out that one should 
be cautious in drawing conclusions from the reported correlation between inherited control and 
performance on the management abilities of heirs. They show that performance is negatively 
related to the likelihood that founders retain the CEO title. Founder CEOs are observed to step 
down after periods of good performance. Thus, the authors conclude that ‘if performance is 
mean reverting and founders leave at its peak, one should observe a decline in performance when 
founders transfer control to their heirs even when inherited control is not bad for performance’ 
(p.17).  
Taking the above set of studies together, this literature gives some support to rather a 
negative than a positive link between succession and preceding corporate performance. 
Expecting succession in the future, firm owners deter long term decisions and tend to invest less. 
Concerning post-succession performance, the evidence is inconclusive. However, most of the 
above-described studies only provide indirect evidence on post-succession performance as they 
are cross-sectional studies comparing the relative performance of family successors to other 
CEOs and not analysing the effects of successions per se. The present study pursues a different 
approach. Using a ten-year panel and analysing performance changes over time, direct evidence 
on the consequences of succession is derived.  
Apart from the work of Sraer and Thesmar (2004) all studies mentioned are conducted on 
large publicly traded Canadian and U.S. family firms. Little is known on the implications of 
succession on performance in European family firms. The present study shifts the focus to 
continental Europe where arrangements, legal rules and social customs differ considerably. It 
provides the micro-level evidence on effects of successions in Austrian family businesses. 
Contrary to previous studies, we do not focus on financial performance but analyse employment 
growth and investment behaviour.  
 
III. Data  
Our analysis is based on a ten-year panel (1995-2004) of more than 4,000 Austrian small 
and medium-sized manufacturing companies, of which about 90% are family firms. The data is 
provided by the Austrian Institute for SME Research which is the largest research institute in 
Austria focusing on small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The institute annually collects 
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extensive information on the performance of roughly 4,500 manufacturing companies. The 
dataset contains the total number of employees, three alternative measures for investment 
(investment in buildings, investment in machinery and equipment, total investments) as well as 
some firm characteristics such as firm age, the firm owner’s age and the number of ownership 
changes since the foundation of the firm.  
In 1999, 2002 and 2005 the survey includes information on the firm owner’s succession 
plans.5 In particular, business owners were asked to report on two aspects of succession. First, 
they indicate whether they plan to transfer the firm within the following 10 years, and second, 
they report whether the firm has been handed over to them during the last 3 years. Succession 
plans of roughly 4,000 entrepreneurs are available from each survey. In 1999 about 39% of the 
respondents indicate that they plan to transfer the firm within the next 10 years. In the same year, 
about 12% of the respondents report that their firm has been handed over to them within the last 
three years.  
 In the following, succession data from the 1999 survey are used to analyse the 
relationship between succession and firm growth in the time period from 1996 to 2004. This 
enables us to investigate changes in growth rates due to both, planned and realised successions. 
We particularly focus on the consequences of planned and realised successions on employment 
growth and investment behaviour. Estimation results from the 2002 survey are very similar to 
those reported in section IV and are thus mentioned only as far as they provide important 
additional information.  
Table I provides a first glance on the total number of employees and total investment 
according to firm’s actual and planned succession behaviour in 1998. Analysing succession 
plans, we find hardly any significant differences in employment and investment between firms 
reporting succession plans for the ensuing ten years (PSUCC=1) and those that do not 
(PSUCC=0). Conversely, recently transferred firms (ASUCC=1) invest more and typically 
employ a larger number of workers than firms that did not undergo succession (ASUCC=0). The 
differences in employment (investment) are statistically significant in 9 (5) out of 10 years.6  
 
                                                 
5 The extended surveys with the relevant succession information were conducted in 1999, 2002 and 2005 but the 
gathered information refers to the years 1998, 2001 and 2004. For reasons of simplicity we decided to refer to the 
former as the relevant dates of interest. 
6 The observation that firms which were handed over are larger (in terms of employment) is also consistent with 
previous studies that found a significant positive impact of firm size on the probability of family succession 
(Stiglbauer and Weiss, 2000; Kimhi and Nachlieli, 2001; Glauben et al., 2002).   
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TABLE I 
Descriptive Statistics: Employment and Total Investment 
Notes: Employment is total number of employees. Investment is total investments in Euro. ASUCC9698 is set equal to 1 where a succession has taken place within the years 1996 and 1998 
and is 0 otherwise. Similarly, PSUCC98 is set equal to 1 in cases where the entrepreneur plans to hand over the firm within the next 10 years and is 0 otherwise. The top number in each cell 
is the mean; the bottom number is either the standard deviation (in italics) or the t-statistic (in parentheses). Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) 
level. 
 
 
 
 
 
Employment  
    
Total Investment  
 
 ASUCC9698=1 ASUCC9698=0   PSUCC98=1 PSUCC98=0   ASUCC9698=1 ASUCC9698=0  PSUCC98=1 PSUCC98=0   
Year Mean Mean Difference Mean Mean Difference  Year Mean Mean Difference Mean Mean Difference  
 Std. Dev. Std. Dev. (t-stat) Std. Dev. Std. Dev. (t-stat)    Std. Dev. Std. Dev. (t-stat) Std. Dev. Std. Dev. (t-stat)  
                                 
1996 24.62 19.78 4.83  19.99 20.21 -0.23  1996 101,903 105,671 -3768  97,840 111,004 -13,163  
 33.00 29.79 (2.67) *** 28.13 31.39 (-0.19)  225,647 317,253 (-0.16)  255,138 346,189 (-0.79)  
1997 22.90 18.86 4.05  18.89 19.16 -0.27  1997 97,582 83,940 13641  73,797 88,246 -14,449  
 30.21 29.56 (2.32) ** 27.10 30.55 (-0.25)  269,001 251,243 (0.84)  184,002 270,147 (-1.43)  
1998 23.26 19.10 4.16  19.51 19.03 0.49  1998 140,847 86,184 54663  81,983 101,593 -19,610  
 31.89 31.97 (2.69) *** 31.16 31.34 (0.48)  426,867 332,444 (3.08) *** 267,677 393,795 (-1.59)  
1999 21.81 18.44 3.37  19.17 17.86 1.31  1999 131,510 84,312 47199  83,094 90,410 -7,316  
 27.71 29.23 (1.99) ** 28.90 26.98 (1.23)  307,086 273,252 (2.60) *** 246,026 286,976 (-0.61)  
2000 22.82 19.14 3.69  19.32 18.92 0.40  2000 118,431 91,423 27008  82,866 100,921 -18,055  
 31.31 30.75 (2.01) ** 28.89 30.69 (0.34)  336,324 319,884 (1.31)  247,660 362,456 (-1.31)  
2001 20.61 17.94 2.67  19.33 16.89 2.43  2001 92,305 79,439 12866  83,156 79,200 3,956  
 25.44 28.85 (1.50)  29.92 26.51 (2.13) ** 243,034 277,311 (0.70)  283,993 266,360 (0.32)  
2002 22.28 18.65 3.63  20.55 17.76 2.79  2002 221,348 102,864 118484  121,890 85,162 36,727  
 31.01 32.65 (1.76) * 37.38 28.42 (2.03) ** 1,590,183 752,694 (1.92) * 982,948 326,096 (1.20)  
2003 21.85 17.59 4.26  18.50 17.07 1.43  2003 85,092 57,883 27209  54,045 63,874 -9,829  
 27.11 27.24 (2.28) ** 27.62 25.55 (1.18)  165,226 178,702 (2.11) ** 165,244 183,202 (-1.13)  
2004 21.21 17.31 3.89  18.41 16.90 1.51  2004 117,326 71,178 46148  93,802 61,155 32,647  
  24.97 26.45 (2.01) ** 24.92 25.82 (1.20)   312980 280,669 (2.03) ** 371,862 198,373 (2.18) ** 
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TABLE II 
Descriptive Statistics: Change in Employment and Total Investment, 02049698−  
Notes: Row Percentages; Base: three-year averages (9698).  
 
 
Table II reports descriptive statistics for long run employment and investment growth 
(using three-year averages7). The results suggest that employment growth is significantly 
stronger for firms where succession has taken place during the previous three years. For 
example, 27% of businesses that experienced succession in the past have grown by one fifth or 
more, compared with 21% for all businesses. The impact of realised successions on investment 
behaviour is less clear. No differences can be observed when succession plans are considered.  
 
IV. Estimation Model and Results 
More detailed evidence on the ‘shadow of succession’ can be obtained from estimating 
econometric models on employment and investment for firm i at date t: 
titiititi XJSUCCY ,,1,, lnln εδγβα ++++=Υ −   APJ ,=     (1) 
                                                 
7  Three-year averages are used since the respondents were asked for realised successions within the past three years. 
Each firm, of which at least one observation over the relevant three years is available, is considered in that variable. 
This procedure guarantees that only a minimum of observations is lost and that short-run cyclical fluctuations are 
removed. 
  Change in Employment 
 
Decrease of 20% 
or more 
Decrease of  
5% to 20% Stable 
Increase of 
 5% to 20% 
Increase of  
20% or more 
           
All Establishments 759 (32%) 481 (20%) 341 (15%) 282 (12%) 487 (21%) 
      
  ASUCC9698=1 78 (30%) 36 (14%) 42 (16%) 34 (13%) 71 (27%) 
  ASUCC9698=0 681 (33%) 445 (21%) 299 (14%) 248 (12%) 416 (20%) 
     
  PSUCC98=1 301 (34%) 188 (21%) 125 (14%) 114 (13%) 158 (18%) 
  PSUCC98=0 458 (31%) 293 (20%) 216 (15%) 168 (12%) 329 (22%) 
 Change in Total Investment 
 
Decrease of 60% 
or more 
Decrease of  
30% to 60% Stable 
Increase of 
 30% to 60% 
Increase of  
60% or more 
      
All Establishments 456 (20%) 283 (12%) 383 (16%) 116 (5%) 1,112 (47%) 
      
  ASUCC9698=1 59 (23%) 23 (9%) 52 (20%) 21 (8%) 106 (40%) 
  ASUCC9698=0 397 (19%) 260 (12%) 331 (16%) 95 (5%) 1,006 (48%) 
      
  PSUCC98=1 166 (19%) 96 (11%) 155 (17%) 49 (6%)  420 (47%) 
  PSUCC98=0 290 (20%) 187 (13%) 228 (15%) 67 (5%) 692 (47%) 
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Our dependent variable is the logarithm of employment and investment, respectively. 1,ln −Υ ti  is 
the logarithm of each company’s initial employment or investment level. JSUCCi = (PSUCCi , 
ASUCCi) is our dummy for planned succession and actual succession. PSUCC is set equal to 1 in 
cases where entrepreneur i plans to hand over the firm within the next 10 years and is 0 
otherwise. Similarly, ASUCC is set equal to 1 where a succession has taken place within the last 
3 years and is 0 otherwise. tiX ,  is a vector of additional explanatory variables which we include 
to control for specific firm and market characteristics. Our control variables include dummies for 
industry, region and generation, the company’s age, the owner’s gender and the owner’s age. We 
are primarily interested in comparing the parameter γ  over time to see how the impact of 
succession considerations on firm performance changes over time.  
 Our analysis of the relationship between succession and firm growth consists of a series 
of multivariate OLS regressions. To begin with, equation (1) is estimated using three-year 
averages. Table III reports the coefficient estimates for the succession variables; more details on 
the results of the regression model are provided in the Appendix. Analysing succession plans, we 
do not find a significant effect on employment growth and investment behaviour. The parameter 
estimates for the dummy ‘planned succession’ are not statistically significant at the 5% level. 
This may have two reasons. First, succession plans could be very vague due to the long planning 
horizon of ten years. This reduces the liability of the answers and increases the probability of an 
intention-behaviour discrepancy.8 Second, one could also reject our hypothesis that future 
succession plans cast their shadows on firm performance.9  
 In contrast to succession plans, actual succession in the past is found to have a significant 
and positive impact on employment growth for the 02049698−  time period. The coefficient for 
‘actual succession’ reported in Table III is significant at a 1% level and suggests that 
employment growth is 14 percent points larger for firms that experienced succession in the past 
compared to firms that reported no succession. Given an average level of employment of roughly 
 
                                                 
8 Authors from different fields of economics (and, in particular, from economic psychology and marketing) have 
challenged the usefulness of intention measures (such as succession plans) as a predictor for actual behaviour. 
Foxall (1983), for example, argues that a high intention-behaviour correspondence should be expected only under 
strictly limited (and unrealistic) conditions. Empirical support for the intention-behaviour discrepancy in succession 
plans is provided by Väre et al. (2004). 
9 Further estimation experiments using information on realised successions between 1999 and 2001 and analysing 
firm performance prior to the succession events have been carried out. Again no significant relationship between 
employment growth and future succession is found, providing further evidence for the rejection of the ‘shadow of 
succession’ hypothesis prior to transition.   
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TABLE III 
Effects of Actual and Planned Successions on Employment Growth and Investment Behaviour 
Notes: Estimated equation: (1). Dependent Variable: Three-Year averages. Estimation method: OLS; 
Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level. 
 
19 employees over the 1996 to 1998 time period, this corresponds to 3 additional jobs per firm, 
revealing a considerable medium-run succession effect. Contrary, no such effect is found for the 
short-time period from 99019698− , indicating that there is a consolidation time period after 
succession before employment effects are observable.   
 Neither short-run nor medium-run effects are found when investment behaviour is 
analysed. The parameter estimates reported in Table III are positive but not significantly 
different from zero. Thus, no significant relationship between past succession and investment 
behaviour is found. This result remains unchanged when alternative investment measures such as 
investment in buildings or investment in machinery and equipment are considered. 
 Table IV reports more details on the regression analysis for the only specification in 
Table III, in which the parameter estimate of a succession variable is significantly different from 
zero. The estimation model in Table IV is statistically significant at the 1 % level or better as 
measured by the F-statistic. Also, a relatively large proportion of the variance in the data can be 
explained in the econometric model, as indicated by the R-squared. However, important 
determinants of firm growth such as the financial structure of firms, profitability and 
productivity, the employee’s attitude toward risk are not considered in the model and may 
account for part of the unexplained variation.  
The parameter estimate of LEMPLOY9698 provides evidence on ‘Gibrat’s Law of 
Proportionate Effects’, which states that the rate of firm growth is independent of initial firm 
size. The specific case where the coefficient is equal to unity implies that proportionate changes 
in size are independent of size. For estimates greater than unity, large firms grow faster than 
small ones, and vice versa for estimates less than unity. According to Table IV, the parameter  
 
 Independent Variable Actual Succession  Independent Variable Planned Succession 
          
Dependent Variable: 
 ln Employment  
Coef.  
ASUCC9698 t-value  Obs.  
Coef. 
PSUCC98 t-value  Obs. 
9901 0.036 (1.30)  1007  -0.020 (-1.12)  1017 
0204  0.146 (3.65) *** 1021  -0.024 (-0.93)  1031 
Dependent Variable:  
ln Total Investment 
 
Coef.  
ASUCC9698 t-value  Obs.  
Coef. 
PSUCC98 t-value  Obs. 
9901 0.134 (1.22)  850  0.054 (0.71)  858 
0204  0.037 (0.30)  835  0.074 (0.86)  839 
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 TABLE IV 
Employment Equation with the ‘Actual Succession’ Dummy Variable:  02049698−  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Estimation method: OLS. The left out category is GEN-1. 
 
estimate of LEMPLOY9698 is less than unity, indicating that small firms grow faster than larger 
ones. However, statistical tests show that the coefficient is not significantly different from unity.  
However, it is also evident from Table IV that our analysis potentially suffers from an 
endogeneity problem. More specifically, there is a problem of distinguishing cause and effect 
with respect to succession and firm size. A firm that experienced succession in the past, for 
example, might grow faster and employ additional staff. Yet, the causation could also be 
reversed. Empirical studies on the probability of succession suggest that the decision to transfer 
the firm is positively affected by the size of the company (Stiglbauer and Weiss 2000; Glauben 
et al. 2002). Again, firm size and succession would be positively correlated and would bias our 
estimates of the causal impact of realised succession upward. To address this problem of 
reversed causality, we apply a two-step procedure to investigate both, the decision to transfer the 
firm and the consequences of succession. First, a single equation probit model is estimated for 
realised succession between 1996 and 1998. Firm size is included, using the average 
employment level over the years 1996, 1997 and 1998. In a second step, the calculated 
Dependent Variable: Ln Employment 0204  
  
Independent Variable (Symbol): Parameter (t-value)   
Constant -0.2399 (-1.03)   
lnEmployment  9698 (LEMPLOY9698)  0.9832 (63.71) *** 
Actual Succession ASUCC9698 0.1457 (3.65) *** 
Age of the company (AGEC) 0.0003 (0.63)  
Age of the company's owner (AGEO) 0.0065 (0.79)  
Age of the company's owner squared (AGEO2)/100 -0.0077 (-0.98)  
Second Generation (GEN-2) -0.0144 (-0.46)  
Third Generation (GEN-3) -0.0460 (-0.98)  
Third++ Generation (GEN-4) -0.0219 (-0.40)  
Gender of firm owner (GENDER) -0.0063 (-0.15)  
9 Regional Dummy Variables   YES  
21 Sectoral Dummy Variables   YES  
Number of observations   1021  
F(36, 984)     147.88   
Prob>F   0.0000  
R-squared   0.8440  
Adj R-squared   0.8383  
Root MSE     0.39363   
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probabilities are introduced into our original model instead of the succession dummy variable. 
Our results are robust to these changes and are available from the authors upon request. 
A number of additional control variables are included in the estimation model. Previous 
studies suggest that younger firms grow faster than older ones. However, we do not find 
evidence for a significant impact of the company’s age (AGEC) in the estimation model. We 
further introduced firm owner’s age (AGEO) and firm owner’s age squared (AGEO2) into the 
model. In contrast to previous studies (Gale 1994; Weiss 1999), the results do not suggest an age 
effect to exist in the present context. 
Following Villalonga and Amit (2005) four generation dummies for management 
ownership in the first, second, third, fourth or even earlier generation (GEN-1, GEN-2, GEN-3, 
GEN-4) have been included to test the hypothesis that there is a significant difference in firm 
growth between founder controlled firms and descendant controlled firms. According to Table 
IV there is some evidence that descendent controlled firms grow more slowly than founder 
controlled firms. The coefficient estimates for GEN-2, GEN-3 and GEN-4 are all negative albeit 
not statistically significant. This result is also in line with previous studies reporting that 
descendants perform worse than founders (Morck et al. 1998; Anderson and Reeb 2003; 
Villalonga and Amit 2005). 
The coefficient for the gender of the company’s owner (GENDER) has a negative sign 
indicating that male business owners perform worse than female entrepreneurs. Again, this effect 
is not significantly different from zero, though this contrasts to previous studies reporting 
significantly higher growth rates for companies operated by men (Variyam and Kraybill 1994; 
Weiss 1999).  
Finally, nine regional dummy variables and 21 sectoral dummy variables have been 
added to the equation to control for regional and sectoral fixed effects. The parameter estimates 
are not reported in Table IV but are available from the authors upon request. 
Figure I reports the results of estimating the employment growth function for different 
time periods. In addition to the parameter estimates, an interval of plus/minus 1.96 times the 
standard error is shown. Figure I suggest that the parameter is positive but insignificant at first, 
but then displays a strongly significant and positive effect of succession on subsequent 
employment growth. After some years of consolidation successors start expanding and hire 
additional employees. A succession coefficient of 0.16 for the period from 9698  to 2004 implies 
for example that over this period recently transferred companies grow 16 percent points faster  
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FIGURE I 
Actual succession coefficient estimates of the employment growth function 
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than equivalent companies that reported no succession. The short run employment effects are 
considerably smaller as indicated by a coefficient estimate of 0.02 for the period from 9698 to 
2001. Hence, analysing employment growth for different time periods largely supports the 
findings from Table III.10  
 
V. Conclusion  
 The aim of this paper was to analyse the relationship between succession and firm 
performance. Using a unique panel data set on a sample of roughly 4,000 Austrian family firms 
we examine empirically the impact of past (actual) succession as well as future (planned) 
succession on employment growth and investment behaviour. Analysing succession plans, we do 
not find a ‘shadow of succession’ effect. No significant difference in employment growth and 
investment behaviour is found between firms that plan to transfer the firm in the next ten years 
and those who do not. In contrast, past succession exerts a significant and positive employment 
                                                 
10 These employment effects remain unchanged when adding the control variables into the model. Succession results 
based on the 2001 sample largely confirm these results; the only difference being a shorter consolidation phase. The 
relevant coefficient is statistically significant from the second year after the succession period onward.   
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growth effect which becomes stronger over time. The impact of past succession on investment 
behaviour is also positive but not significantly different from zero. Thus, our findings provide 
support for the existence of a positive employment shadow after a transfer, whereas the shadow 
of succession hypothesis has to be rejected prior to transition.  
Two limitations to the results have to be mentioned. First, selection bias is a potentially 
serious weakness of our analysis as we were unable to study the effects of succession on the 
probability of firm exits. The results in this paper should be seen strictly as an analysis of 
employment and investment growth inside continuing businesses. And second, the present 
analysis does not take into account that succession within the family may have different 
consequences compared to firms where the successor is not a family member. The fact that we 
focus on successions in general and do not analyse succession within and outside a family 
separately makes comparison with previous studies in this field difficult.   
However, by analysing performance changes over time the present study provides direct 
evidence on the consequences of succession and can be seen as a major contribution to existing 
cross sectional studies on this issue. The positive employment effect of succession reported again 
underlines the importance of succession for the aggregate labour market in Austria. An estimated 
51,500 Austrian small and medium sized enterprises will face the challenge of succession over 
the decade 2004-2013, potentially affecting 438,000 employees or 17% of all jobs in the 
Austrian industry (Mandl 2004). Therefore, the success of business successions is, not at least 
because of the effect on the labour market, of particular importance for the economy. Our results 
strongly support the notion that it is essential to raise public awareness of the importance of 
business succession as an attractive alternative to starting up one’s own business.  
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